Introduction
Just over a year ago, Lesotho went through a general elections which all international election observers concluded had been free, fair and transparent. With no political party achieving an overall majority, it was clear that coalition politics was the only game in town. A motley of seven political parties ultimately managed to cobble a coalition government under the leadership of Prime Minister Mosisili. In his inaugural speech he promised milk and honey but more importantly spoke about how he would restore the good name of the country which was constantly being tarnished by the unsavory things done by his defeated competitors. He promised good democratic governance and accepted the reform package which had been suggested by the Commonwealth Special Envoy to Lesotho, Dr. Prasad. It was an optimistic posture, which those unfamiliar with Lesotho politics could have been impressed with.
The elephant in the room however was Kamoli, who had been dismissed by the previous government but backed by those who have now cobbled a seven member political parties coalition government. Almost all those who formed the government had in one form or another supported Kamoli’s unconstitutional refusal to leave office when a government in power dismissed him. Prime Minister Mosisili had therefore created, even before going into office a conundrum which faces him up to today. It was fear of the wrath of Kamoli who was his ally when former Prime Minister Thabane fired him; it was also the fear of losing the support of some of his coalition partners who would not have countenanced being in government without Kamoli. It would not have worked. Kamoli himself would not have accepted that since he is the one who effectively dispatched the previous government by protecting and sanctioning several unconstitutional acts like keeping a Minister who had been dismissed like him by force in the Ministry of Communications.
On the other hand, Mosisili has now had to face a strong SADC demand that he undo his alliance with Kamoli. Following the Phumaphi Commission Report which SADC has endorsed, and demands implementation of its recommendations, Mosisili is now faced by his fear of Kamoli and also fear of the collapse of his coalition on the one hand; and on the other hand he has to deal with the uncompromising stance of SADC that he must stand up against his demons. He must fire Kamoli and have Kamoli’s soldiers who have been shielded from the criminal justice system arrested. His conundrum is real! It is however a self-inflicted wound.
Legitimizing an Attempted Coup
Mosisili’s double fears must be properly understood. His first fear, is that of Kamoli. When in August 2014, Kamoli made a concerted attempt to stage a coup which was bound to fail as a result of the South African government’s stance, the stage was set for long-term confrontation with whatever government that came in power in Lesotho. Kamoli’s coup did not succeed, and he stayed in power by force of arms after his dismissal. He was ultimately coaxed to go on what was called a leave of absence outside the country until after the holding of the 2015 elections by Cyril Ramaphosa under the Maseru Security Accord.
Two developments are important here in order to understand the Prime Minister’s dilemma at present. When Kamoli was fired by then Prime Minister Thabane, his Deputy, Mothetjwa Metsing, immediately went on Lesotho Television, popularly known as “TV Monga eona”, and declared that he does not recognize Kamoli’s dismissal because he was not consulted. The issue however was not about consultation, but about the constitutional right of the Prime Minister to fire the Commander of the LDF. Similarly Sekhamane, present Lesotho Foreign Minister, publicly threatened a bloodbath should an attempt be made to get rid of Kamoli.
After Prime Minister Mosisili came to office in March 2015 he thanked the military for ensuring that he was back in power. Since then he has on several occasions publicly backed Kamoli and reiterated his gratefulness to the army for supporting him. The question however has always been whether an armed man who has previously virtually taken a government down could ever be controlled by any successor regime. This is essentially the foundation of Mosisili’s fear. Could Kamoli also do to him what he did to Thabane?
Mosisili also has to contend with the fear of the potential alliance between Kamoli and his coalition partner, LCD, which no longer has any significant following in the country but is firmly ensconced in the army. With Mokhosi as Defence Minister and Metsing as Deputy Prime Minister, like he was under Thabane, Mosisili has to constantly wonder whether they could remove him in power at the time of their choosing. The constant declarations by Mosisili that he trusts Kamoli are essentially an indication of his insecurity.
Mosisili’s fear therefore is that both Metsing and Kamoli could overthrow him even though he actively abetted the attempted coup and the unconstitutional refusal of Kamoli to leave office when he was fired. Bringing back to office of Kamoli therefore was logical and inevitable, because of fear of his retribution if he was ignored.
SADC Demands on Mosisili
In its Summit in Gaborone in January 2016 SADC in an unprecedented move, demanded that Kamoli must be fired and that all those implicated in the treasonous activities of August 2014 be brought before the courts; those who have committed murder and have been shielded by Kamoli must be suspended and brought to the courts to answer for themselves; the exiled Basotho should be brought back to the country, particularly the leaders of the opposition political parties; and the freeing of the detained soldiers in line with the recommendations of the Phumaphi Report.
In a follow-up meeting between Mozambican President Nyusi, Chairman of the SADC Organ on Politics Defense and Security and the Lesotho delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Metsing, the situation was put bluntly to the Lesotho delegation. Lesotho has a deadline to implement the decisions of SADC. Failure to comply will lead to serious consequences. Needless to say that Metsing was told in no uncertain terms that there are no two ways about the matter. Lesotho has to implement the decisions. In conclusion, Nyusi informed the Deputy Prime Minister “…..the Chairperson stressed that in line with the 18th January 2016 SADC Double Troika Summit decisions, in the event that there is no progress on the above issues, SADC will consider convening a Double Troika Summit to deliberate on the matter.” This is not an ordinary statement. It is unambiguous and those who attended the meeting knew that it was an indication that SADC is focused on accountability. An external element of the fears of Mosisili has now been made clear.
Mosisili’s fears are however not only confined to what steps SADC will take. Two related issues are ever looming in the background. First, is the possibility of losing even more international funding from external sources in addition to the withdrawal of budget support by the EU which has recently been announced. Second is the possibility of losing an even bigger chunk of money from the US under the MCC which had made the implementation of the Phumaphi Report recommendations a condition for considering Lesotho’s application. Without the dismissal of Kamoli, there is no chance of Lesotho being granted the funds.
Will Mosisili Break the Deadlock?
The issue at hand is that Mosisili has created a conundrum for himself. He brought Kamoli back from the cold and he is now fearful of any action which he might take. He fears both his Deputy and Kamoli. At the same time he fully knows that he cannot defy SADC. Lesotho meantime grinds to a halt while Prime Minister ponders his next move.
It is accordingly not surprising that for almost a month Mosisili has disappeared from the scene. The last time Basotho have heard about him and his whereabouts was when he was reported to have gone on a two week holiday in India. But whether he is still in India or ensconced at State House, his conundrum awaits him. He has to take the chance to dismiss his ally or else he has to face up to the furious SADC leadership which will meet after 31/03/16 to decide how to implement the decisions with or without him. I wish him well!
Professor Mafa M. Sejanamane
lesothoanalysis 
March 16, 2016 at 5:36 pm
Actually if he was a smart man he could have ran away a long time ago when he sees that he doesn’t have any other way out of this mess, but for the fact that he thinks he is the only one who can lead this country, this is why he hadn’t flee. Hela old man do the honourable thing ITOKOLLE botonakholong. Fullstop
LikeLike
March 16, 2016 at 5:55 pm
I like these posts, the last sentence I also wish him well!
LikeLike
March 17, 2016 at 6:05 am
Lest people forget, the relationship between DC and LDF became obvious in the run-up to 2012 polls. Observors will remember LDF statement that they would deal firmly with people disrupting DC rallies after the Maputsoe and Thetsane where PM’s rallies were marred by violence. The Police got urged our of their constitutional mandate since then. It was not surprising then to hear Minister of Defence saying on Catholic Radio Wednesday 16 March 2016 that the Army is stationed in Qacha to fight stock theft. As to why it is the LDF fighting stock theft and killing people in the process and NOT the Police is seriously disturbing. How long this praetorian tendencies will go on is difficult to tell.
LikeLike
March 21, 2016 at 11:45 pm
The subject of legitimacy shapes the entirety of the discussion here. Even though this is not a widely shared opinion. Legitimisation of the alleged coup by Kamoli is threefold. First as rightly pointed out by Prof. Sejanamane the swift defense by the then Deputy Prime Minister afforded the Commander because he was not consulted.
The second one is an issue of ethical and moral considerations. While the constitution is such a principal instrument for legitimate governance, what then happens when the constitution does not provide for new forms of governance? This question emanates from a historical perspective that the shape and form of Lesotho’s constitution is that of an ornamental artifact on leadership and governance. It appears to do the job but does not address the issues. In such a case, where then do voids gain legitimacy? Through moral and ethical standing or pinning the constitution to a wall to provide what it is not capable of by hook or crook?
An understanding in the 2012 coalition regime was that legitimacy would be drawn from a MoU from an ethical and moral standing borne out of trust by parties involved. When such trust is broken would it not have been sensible to have dissolved government immediately since all parties would be operating in breach of the MoU, the one document that had charted legitimacy to the kind of new governance style then? It is important to understand context for us to apply instruments, ideas, theories and opinions. Therefore in the context of what was agreed upon by the coalition government in 2012 the Deputy Prime Minister had a legitimate claim even though it was not popularly accepted. (Another level of legitimacy or illegitimacy that can be looked into another time).
Thirdly, when the “two commanders” were put on special leave outside the country to arguably prevent an impending military implosion and explosion even after the dismissal of the other this in part was to legitimise their role as key military men in Lesotho’s security system. Not a creation of the current regime but definitely a nightmare they live with on a daily basis after reverting a dismissal. Kamoli’s legitimacy was stamped before the 2015 snap election, the current regime only delivered the letter amidst a public outcry depending on whose side of the public one is on. Very messy.
The premise to interrogate legitimacy is guided by the theory of leadership as a process not position or person. If we stick to the two we will never get out of the cesspool we are swimming in. Whether it is Kamoli in place or someone else, if the process of leadership has no clarity and consistency, anyone of these soldiers can potentially hijack the system as it seems or it is now. Process first engages with context or situation. If we do not understand, not know or not aware of the subliminal landscape of impending problems, our mode of analysis could be skewed, biased, partially informed (question of available data) even with the best of intentions. Other than appointments by civilian regimes how else and what are processes put into place to hold military men accountable from a national point of view not SADC point of view. One would believe SADC would be second resort after as a nation we had failed to caucus on this. SADC is not different from UN, they make problems go away but it does not mean the source of the problem has been addressed adequately.
Secondly if our leadership is only shaped by political following (parties) with no binding issues to the development of the nation and state. We will be forced to argue our cases guided by sympathy to the other. It is necessary to have a following with shared values and mutuality for the common good not for the common good of the other party. Here lies our failing, believing the common good of the other party is the common good of the whole nation. Legitimacy of regimes and military commanders lies with votes not shared national values. Where is legitimacy in that? Where is legitimacy in those votes cannot be used to hold anyone accountable? The issue of legitimacy in these instances raises a myriad of questions and a mirage of answers.
LikeLike